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BlUCKER AmENDmENT

TREATY LAW VS. DOMESTIC
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish
temper and confined views. People will not look forward to
posterity who never look backward to their ancestors.'
The present Senate Joint Resolution 1 is designed to prevent abuse of the treaty-making and other international
agreement-making powers.2 After extensive hearings, the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary amended and reported S.
J. Res. 1 with a favorable recommendation, only four of its
fifteen members dissenting.'
Critics of S. J. Res. 1 assert that the proposed amendment
was born in a reckless spirit of innovation. They say, for
example, that the amendment "would leave the United States
only partially sovereign." ' The amendment, it is charged,
would "virtually abolish" the traditional treaty-making
power "as it was conferred on the Federal Government 164
BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON TnE REVOLUTION IN FRAc 47, 48 (5th ed. 1797).
S.J. Res. 1 was introduced in the Senate on January 7, 1953 and co-sponsored by this writer and 63 other Senators. 99 CoNG. REc. 160, 161 (Jan. 7, 1953).
Many similar joint resolutions are pending before the House Committee on the
Judiciary.
1

2

3

SEN. REP. No. 412, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (1953).

4 Id. at 35. (Minority opinion)

(529)
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years ago." ' Proponents of S. J. Res. 1 are accused of an evil
design to "reduce the President to a mere figurehead in foreign affairs .... " 6 In short, opponents of any treaty-control
amendment represent themselves as conservative guardians
of the sovereignty and the Constitution of the United States.
Analysis of constitutional history has seldom been so superficial or the posture of intelligent men so awkward.
Many opponents of S. J. Res. 1, among them Professor
Philip Jessup, are avowed enemies of the concept of national
sovereignty. Thus their contention that S. J. Res. 1 undermines national sovereignty has a peculiar grace. Professor
Jessup, for example, has described national sovereignty as
"the root of the evil," a root which should "first be loosened
by digging around it and cutting the rootlets one by one"
rather than pulling up the root "by one mighty revolutionary
heave," as advocated by many world government enthusiasts.7 Professor Jessup has urged such "restrictions on sovereignty as are necessary to meet the legitimate aspirations of
peoples who have never attained a reasonably good life"
meaning, of course, unlimited restrictions. Those who pose as
defenders of national sovereignty in fighting any treatycontrol amendment have advocated the use of United Nations
treaties to effect a massive surrender of national sovereignty.9
Equally hypocritical is the argument that S. J. Res. 1 would
hamstring our traditional treaty power to meet an imaginary
danger. That danger was never more accurately described
than by Mr. John Foster Dulles in his Louisville, Kentucky
speech of April 12, 1952. Mr. Dulles said:1"
The treatymaking power is an extraordinary power, liable to
abuse. Treaties make international law and also they make
5 Id. at 35, 43.
6 Id. at 48.
7

JESsUP, THTE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM Or GOVERNING MANEIND

8

Id. atS.

2 (1947).

Id. at 13.
Reprinted in Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on S. J. Res. 1 and S. J. Res. 43, 83d Cong., Ist Sess., 862 (1953).
9
10
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domestic law. Under our Constitution, treaties become the
supreme law of the land. They are, indeed, more supreme than
ordinary laws for congressional laws are invalid if they do not
conform to the Constitution, whereas treaty law can override
the Constitution. Treaties, for example, can take powers away
from the Congress and give them to the President; they can
take powers from the States and give them to the Federal
Government or to some international body, and they can cut
across the rights given the people by their constitutional Bill
of Rights.

Scores of United Nations treaties in various stages of
preparation would, if ratified, produce the tragic results depicted by Mr. Dulles. Many of those treaties conflict with the
Constitution of the United States. They inspired the introduction of S. J. Res. 1. However, many of the self-styled
conservative opponents of any constitutional change endorse
those treaties. For example, the UN draft Statute for an
International Criminal Court would permit an American
citizen to be sent overseas for trial before an international
tribunal without the constitutional 'protections to which he
would be entitled in Federal and State courts.1 Two leading
opponents of S. J. Res. 1, Judge John J. Parker and Professor
Jessup, have advocated the adoption of this treaty. The latter
has written:2
In the relatively simple question of adopting fair procedures
for the Niirnberg Tribunal for the trial of the major German
war criminals, American lawyers had to reconcile their views,
their traditions, and their prejudices to the different views,
traditions, and prejudices of European lawyers. It may be true
that jury trials are necessary to the well-being of every tribe in
Africa; but they are not utilized in every western country,
and it may be that they should not be used. Throughout its
work the Commission on Human Rights will be tossed from
substantive problems to the procedures for their enforcement.
It would do well to avoid seeking to impose as universal concepts those which are historically local phenomena.
11 Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, UN
Document A/Ac.65/L.13 (Aug. 24, 1953).
12 J ssup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 92 (1948).
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The TraditionalTreaty Power of the United States
S. J. Res. 1 would merely apply to the treaty-making power
the constitutional restraints that were originally intended to
govern its exercise.'" Prior to the nation-wide debate on S. J.
Res. 1, opponents of the amendment boasted of their plans
to revolutionize the treaty power.
The traditional scope of the treaty power was thus described by Alexander Hamilton: 4
The power of making treaties ....

relates neither to the

execution of the subsisting laws, nor to the enaction of new
ones ....

Its objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which

have the force of law, but derive it from the obligations of good
faith. They are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the
subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign.

No responsible student of international and constitutional
law has challenged Hamilton's statement on the traditional
function of the treaty power. Even Professor Jessup has
described as "the fundamental tenet of traditional international law ...

that [a treaty] is a law only between states,

not between individuals or between individuals and states." 15
A basic purpose of S. J. Res. 1 is to preserve the traditional
tenets of international law. Professor Jessup, on the other
hand, has written a book repudiating the traditional concept
of international law in which the following statement appears:' 6
Once it is agreed that sovereignty is divisible and that it
therefore is not absolute, various restrictions on and relinquish'ments of sovereignty may be regarded as normal and not stigmatizing. The slow but steady development of majority rule in

international organizations bears witness to the change which is
taking place ....

Notable also are those numerous provisions

in the Charter which recognize that the treatment of the individual citizen is no longer a matter solely of domestic concern

18

See testimony of Dr. George A. Finch, Hearings, supra note 10, at 1111-13,

1121-26, 1133-40.
14 THE FEDERALIST,
15

16

No. 75 at 486 (Modem Library ed. 1937).

JEssup, A MoDERN LAW or NATIONS 8 (1948).
Id. at 41.
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and that the denial of fundamental human rights to a citizen
can no longer be shrouded behind the impenetrable cloak of
national sovereignty.

The argument that the traditional treaty power has worked
well for 164 years and should not be changed collapses under
the facts of international life. A plan to regulate by treaty
the fundamental human rights of people everywhere did not
exist prior to the formation of the United Nations Organization. The departure of the UN's human rights program from
traditional treaty concepts was explained in 1948 by Mr.
John P. Humphrey, then the Director of the UN Division of
Human Rights. Mr. Humphrey said:"'
What the United Nations is trying to do is revolutionary in
character. Human rights are largely a matter of relationships
between the state and individuals, and therefore a matter which
has been traditionally regarded as being within the domestic

jurisdiction of states. What is now being proposed is, in effect,
the creation of some kind of supernational supervision of this
relationship between the state and its citizens.

Many opponents of S. J. Res. 1, including Professor Jessup, seek to elevate treaty law above domestic constitutional
law. They seek to ground the whole spectrum of human
rights -

civil, political, economic, social, and cultural -

in

a law superior to that of the nation. Obviously, the correlative
duties would also be made independent of national law.
Revolutionary proposals seldom inspire constitutional amendments. The Constitution is already an effective barrier in most
cases. Having identified some of the self-styled conservatives
who would revolutionize the world by treaty, we may proceed
to inquire to what extent the Constitution protects us from
their undesirable schemes.
Effect of A Treaty Authorizing What the
ConstitutionExpressly Forbids
The fears of Mr. Dulles expressed in Louisville are shared
by the overwhelming majority of American lawyers. A treaty17

HUMPHREY,

255 ANmALs 15 (fan. 1948).
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control amendment has been advocated by the American Bar
Association, the National Association of Attorneys General,
and more than 20 State bar associations. Basically, the concern of the legal profession stems from an ambiguity in the
treaty supremacy clause. Article VI, Section 2, of the Constitution reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. [Emphasis added]

In Missouri v. Holland,8 Mr. Justice Holmes pointed to
the language of Article VI requiring laws, but not treaties, to
be made "in purstqance" of the Constitution. He suggested
that "under the authority of the United States" might mean
nothing "more than the formal acts prescribed to make the
convention." "9
Following the decision in Missouri v. Holland, Charles
Evans Hughes, a former Secretary of State and Chief Justice
of the United States, stated that the treaty-making power
"has no explicit limitation attached to it, and so far there has
been no disposition to find in anything relating to the external
concerns of the Nation the limitation to be implied." 20 He
went on to say: "I should not care to voice any opinion as to
an implied limitation on the treaty-making power." In early
dicta, the Supreme Court said that the treaty power does not
extend "so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids..." 21 and that Federal jurisdiction cannot "be enlarged
18

252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Id. at 433.
Address before the American Society of International Law reprinted in part
in Hearings,supra note 10, at 52.
21 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). For an example of the change in
judicial dicta, see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-319
(1936), wherein the treaty-making power is regarded as an undelegated, inherent
power of sovereignty. See also United States v. Reid, 73 F.2d 153, 155 (9th Cir.
1934), expressing a doubt whether "courts have power to declare the plain terms of
a treaty void and unenforceable. ..."
19
20
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under the treaty-making power." " Those reassuring statements were repudiated in Missouri v. Holland. To prevent
treaties, in the words of Mr. Dulles, from "cutting across the
rights given the people by their constitutional Bill of Rights,"
Section 1 of S. J. Res. 1 provides:
A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution

shall not be of any force or effect.
With such a provision in the Constitution, the United
States could not become a party to the UN draft Covenants
on Human Rights except, of course, by further amending the
Constitution. Some provisions of the Human Rights Covenants contravene express constitutional prohibitions. For example, Article 14 permits the right to a public trial to be
denied in many cases.23 In addition, Article 2 (1) permits that
dangerously qualified right to be withdrawn completely during a "time of public emergency which threatens the life of
the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed."
On the other hand, the Sixth Amendment to our Constitution
provides for the right of public trial in all cases without any
qualification whatsoever. Because of this unequivocal guaranty the Supreme Court was able to write in 1948:24 "Counsel have not cited and we have been unable to find a single
instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this
country."
Stripped of all flowery abstractions, the naked question
raised by a universal bill of rights is whether or not nations
are willing to subordinate domestic constitutional law to a
higher treaty law. Those who realistically approach the ambitious assignment of governing mankind and re-writing
the law of nations recognize this fact. Hersh Lauterpacht,
Whewell Professor of International Law in the University of
New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 736 (U.S. 1836).
Report of the Commission on Human Rights, 9th Sess., (E/2447, E]CN.
4/689) 43, 44 (1953).
24 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948).
22
2d
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Cambridge, points out that a universal bill of rights "worthy
of the name is not a consummation which can be achieved
without some States [nations] giving up practices and constitutional principles in a way necessary to ensure an irreducible minimum standard of respect for fundamental human
rights.... ."2 5 Professor Jessup has written in the same vein: 2"
The human rights to be defined and protected must be con-

sidered not in a vacuum of theory, but in terms of the constitutions and laws and practices of more than seventy states of
the world. Not every personal guarantee which is congenial to

the constitution of the United States of America is necessarily
well adapted to other civilizations.
To insure the supremacy of constitutional law, S. J. Res. 1
plugs the loophole through which the advocates of treaty law
supremacy propose to crawl. Those who profess a great dislike for constitutional innovation except by treaty have done
much to prove the need for a treaty-control amendment.
The Need to Make Treaties
Non-Self-Executing as Domestic Law
Section 2 of S. J. Res. 1 reads as follows:
A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United
States only through legislation which would be valid in the
absence of treaty. [Emphasis added]

The words underscored above make all treaties non-selfexecuting insofar as they are intended to make domestic law.
The provision would not apply, of course, to treaties dealing
with the nation's external affairs. The proposed amendment
would have no effect whatever on treaties such as the North.
Atlantic Treaty, or on the recent Mutual Defense Treaty
between the United States and Korea." The making of
treaties of this type would not be affected by passage of the
amendment.
25

LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 305

26

JESSUP, A MODERN LAW oF NATIONS 92

27

Executive A, 83d Cong., 2d Se&,.

(1oA)

(1948).

(1st ed. 1950).
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The treaty supremacy clause has often made it irr ossible
for the Senate to know whether or not, and to what extent, a
treaty supersedes federal and state laws. The need to make
all treaties non-self-executing as domestic law became apparent more than a century ago. In 1833, for example, the
Supreme Court held to be self-executing a treaty which it had
held non-self-executing only four years before.2" Not until
novel treaties began to roll off the UN assembly lines, however, did the domestic problem of self-executing treaties
become acute.
Prior to the formation of the United Nations Organization
most treaties having a domestic law effect were bilateral. It
was not too difficult for the negotiators to state their objectives in precise language. In addition, the Senate had a relatively free hand in interpreting the treaty by way of reservations without undue risk of incurring misunderstanding or
ill-will abroad. All this was changed when multipartite
treaties dealing with purely domestic affairs began to pour
forth from various UN catacombs.
When a treaty has several scores of signatories, ambiguities in language are required to insure the maximum number
of ratifications.29 Particularly where the multipartite treaty
deals with essentially domestic matters vague language is
necessary to obscure radically different concepts of human
rights."0 In considering such treaties the Senate does not have,
as a practical matter, a free hand in writing reservations.
Attempted exercise of the right of reservation would require
renegotiation of the treaty with all other parties. It is ex28 Compare, United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51 (U.S. 1833), with Foster v.
Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (U.S. 1829).

29

What definite meaning, for example, can be ascribed to Article 1 (3) of the

UN Covenant of Civil and Political Rights providing: "The right of peoples to self-

determination shall also include permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth
and resources."
80 See the revealing article by Charles A. Malik of Lebanon, formerly Chairman

of the UN Human Rights Commission. MAmx., Human Rights in the United Nations, 13 UNTrED NATIONS BuLETiN 243 (Sept. 1, 1952).
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tremely doubtful that other parties would accede to any
substantial reservation to a multipartite UN treaty. Some
treaties expressly provide that reservations shall not be permitted." By interpretation of the International Court of
Justice, it may be impossible for the Senate to make effective
reservations to other multipartite treaties such as the Genocide Convention. 2 Thus, in dealing with United Nations
treaties, the Senate must give its consent on virtually an "all
or nothing" basis and thereby run the risk of later judicial
interpretation contrary to its own. For example, the relevant
history on Senate ratification of the United Nations Charter
proves conclusively that no reservation to the Charter could
be made. No opponent of S. J. Res. 1 has ever suggested that
the Senate will be free to attach reservations to any amendments that may be adopted at the UN Charter Revision Conference in 1956.
Our treaty supremacy clause is unique. Only in Mexico,
and possibly in France, do treaties become internal law without legislative action." As a result the United States is at a
terrible disadvantage in negotiating treaties with a domestic
law aspect. Other countries do not have anything comparable
to our supremacy clause. Their citizens are not bound by a
treaty unless and only to the extent that the treaty is made
domestic law by their own legislative bodies. American citizens, on the other hand, may be subjected to far-reaching and
unintended changes in their way of life depending on how the
Supreme Court eventually interprets the obscure verbiage
of a self-executing treaty. The Senate, in advising and consenting to ratification of a self-executing treaty, performs an
executive rather than a legislative function. S. J. Res. 1 will
31 Universal Copyright Convention, Art. 20, Executive M, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1953).
32 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1951.
33 See Hearings, supra note 10, at 1113-21 for relevant provisions of the Con-

stitutions of other nations.

THE BRICKER AMENDMENT

insure equality of international obligation as between the
United States and other countries.
Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter contain
some extremely vague human rights provisions. They illustrate the need to make all treaties non-self-executing as
domestic law. It is uncertain, for example, whether Articles
55 and 56 are obligatory on UN member nations or whether
they are merely a statement of high aspiration and purpose.34
If obligatory, it is uncertain whether or not these Articles are
self-executing.35 If the Supreme Court holds Articles 55 and
56 obligatory and self-executing, thousands of federal and
state laws will be nullified even though not one of the 89
Senators who voted for the UN Charter expected any such
result.
Needless to say, many opponents of S. J. Res. 1 believe
that Articles 55 and 56, despite their ambiguity, and without
legislative implementation, should be used to alter radically
the rights and obligations of the States and of the people. For
example, the American Association for the United Nations
filed an amicus brief " in Shelley v. Kraemer37 urging that
these two Articles had transformed the fundamental human
rights of the American people from matters of domestic concern to matters of international concern. Collaborating in the
writing of this remarkable brief were Alger Hiss, Asher Bob
Lans, Philip C. Jessup, Joseph M. Proskauer, Myres S. McDougal and Victor Elting.
During the Senate debate on S. J. Res. 1, the non-selfexecuting feature of Section 2 was modified to permit the
34 See Sayre, Shelley v. Kraemer and United Nations Law, 34 IowA L. REV. 1
(1948), contending that Articles 55 and 56 are obligatory and self-executing.
35 Compare Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (1950), rehearing denied, 218 P.2d
595 (Cal. App. 1950) (holding Articles 55 and 56 self-executing), with the decision
in the same case by the California Supreme Court holding Articles 55 and 56 nonself-executing. 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 217 (1952). See also the concurring opinion
in Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50, 673 (1948) in which four Justices
relied on Articles 55 and 56 as invalidating the Alien Land Law of California.
36 Hearings,supra note 10, at 659-670.
37 334 U.S. 1, 3 (1948).
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Senate by a two-thirds vote to make a treaty immediately
effective as domestic law. This modification eliminated the
objection that the requirement of implementing legislation in
all cases might unnecessarily delay the effectiveness of certain
treaties.
The "Which Clause"

-

States Rights

Section 2 of S. J. Res. 1 not only requires legislation to
make a treaty effective as internal law but further provides
that the legislation must be "legislation which would be valid
in the absence of treaty." The "which clause" would no longer
permit treaties, in the words of Mr. John Foster Dulles, to
"take powers from the States and give them to the Federal
Government or to some international body.. . ." " It reverses
the doctrine of Missouri v. Holland. It places on the treatymaking power the restrictions originally intended to govern
its exercise.
In answer to the fears expressed by Patrick Henry 9 and
others, Thomas Jefferson, after the Tenth Amendment became part of the Constitution, said in his Manual of Parliamentary Practice:"
By the general power to make treaties, the Constitution
must have intended to comprehend only those objects which
are usually regulated by treaties, and cannot be otherwise
regulated.
It must have meant to except out all those rights reserved
to the States; for surely the President and the Senate cannot
do by treaty what the whole Government is interdicted from
doing in any way.
3S Hearings,supra note 10, at 862.
39 Speaking in the Virginia ratifying convention prior to the adoption of the
Bill of Rights, Henry said: "Sure I am, if treaties are made infringing our liberties,
it will he too late to say our constitutional rights are violated." 3 ELLO'r's DEBATES
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 502 and 315-16 (2d ed. 1836). Henry's prophetic
example was a treaty authorizing Americans to be tried abroad for alleged crimes
committed in the United States. The UN draft Statute for an International Criminal
Court does just that.
40 Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives,H.R. Doc. No.
564, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 285 (1952).
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The principal argument advanced against the "which
clause" is that it would require some treaties to be ratified by
48 state legislatures or that it Would give every state a foreign
policy veto power. Under no circumstances would any treaty
on any subject require state ratification. If a treaty concerns
only the nation's external affairs, no legislation, federal or
state, is required. If a treaty seeks to regulate some local state
problem such as divorce or lynching, S. J. Res. 1 would not
prevent the treaty from being made. To conform to the Constitution, however, the treaty would have to provide that it
would become effective only through state legislation.
The necessity of state legislation to implement some
treaties has inspired the reckless charge that S. J. Res. 1
would force a return to the treaty practice under the Articles
of Confederation. The fact is that the United States has made
scores of treaties in the past 100 years which became effective
as internal law only through state acquiescence.41
Because of the erroneous charges leveled against the socalled "which clause," it was eliminated during the Senate
debate so as not to prejudice favorable action on more vital
portions of the amendment. The "which clause" was not designed to protect States' Rights as such. Proponents of a
treaty-control amendment have attempted to draw a line of
demarcation between subject matter appropriate for treaty
negotiation and matters of purely domestic concern never
until recently considered within the purview of the treaty
power.
In reporting S. J. Res. 1 with the "which clause," the Senate Judiciary Committee drew the line of demarcation to
correspond with that dividing federal and state authority.
No better line of demarcation was suggested during the hearings on S. J. Res. 1. Whatever the final outcome of S. J. Res. 1
41 See Article VII of the Treaty of 1853 between the United States and France,
8 STAT. 178, 182 (1853), which was considered in Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258,

266 (1890).
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in the present Congress, advocates of a treaty-control amendment must continue to wrestle with the difficult problem thus
defined by Judge Florence E. Allen: 4
The root of the difficulty lies in the lack of demarcation
between domestic and international legislation. A line must be
drawn beyond which the international organizations know they
cannot pass. The United Nations should draw the line in a resolution of the General Assembly and should facilitate a judgment on the question by the International Court. The United
States should draw the line by amendment to the Federal
Constitution.

A possible solution was recently advanced by Mr. Walter
Brown. Pointing out that the domestic law aspects of a
treaty were intended to be merely incidental to its contractual function, Mr. Brown suggested that "the answer is
to limit the treaty power to domestic law which directly
affects the interests of a foreign state or its nationals." 4 4
Section 2 of S. J. Res. 1, as modified during the debate,
provided:
A treaty or other international agreement shall become
effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation by the Congress unless in advising and consenting to a
treaty the Senate, by a vote of two-thirds of the Senators

present and voting, shall provide that such treaty may become
effective as internal law without legislation by the Congress.

The above provision was rejected by the Senate on February
25, 1954, by a vote of 50 to 42."
Protectionof National Sovereignty Against Treaty Law
A treaty surrendering legislative, executive, or judicial
powers of the United States to a world or regional government would "conflict" with the Constitution within the meaning of Section 1 of the amendment.
This interpretation of the word "conflicts" was not questioned during the Senate debate on S. J. Res. 1. The Admin42

ALLEN, THE TREATY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF LEGISLATION 104, 105 (1952).

43 Brown, A Substitute for the Bricker Amendment, 40 VA. L. Rlv. 113 (1954).
44 Id. at 139.
45 100 CONG. REc. 2150 (Feb. 25, 1954).
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istration did not oppose Section 1 of the amendment denying
any effect to treaties or other international agreements in conflict with the Constitution. Moreover, Senators supporting
the Administration viewpoint conceded that Section 1 would
prevent United States participation in any world or regional
government by treaty or executive agreement. Senator Ferguson, for example, said:46
Mr. President, I wish to repeat that this amendment will prevent the delegation of executive, legislative, or judicial power

to an international organization, for under the Constitution
these powers are vested exclusively in the President, the Congress, and the Federal courts.Thus, Section 1 of the amendment embeds in the Con-

stitution the reassuring dicta of the Supreme Court in the
47
Chinese Exclusion Cases:
The powers of government are delegated in trust to the
United States, and are incapable of transfer to any other
parties. They cannot be abandoned or surrendered.... The
exercise of these public trusts is not the subject of barter or
contract.

Those who yearn for the domination of a supra-national
government fall into various classes. Some would surrender
national sovereignty immediately; others would destroy national sovereignty gradually by means of UN treaties and by
fanciful interpretation of the UN Charter. Some would organize a superstate on a global scale while others would first
establish a regional government. All these groups have one
thing in common. They oppose S. J. Res. 1 which would preserve the sovereignty they are pledged to destroy. Though
opposing S. J. Res. 1, the United World Federalists 4 and the
Atlantic Union advocates 49 have disavowed any intent to
attain their respective goals by the treaty method. The permanence of this renunciation is questionable to say the least
46
47
48
49

100 CONG. REc. 1, 244 (Feb. 4, 1954).

Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
Hearings,supra note 10, at 735, 736.
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committi
on Revision of the United Nations Charter,81st Cong., 2d Sess. 237 (1949).
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However commendable this temporary respect for the spirit
of the Constitution, it is doubtful that the Constitution in its
present form would prevent United States participation in
world government by treaty.5"
Some opponents of S. J. Res. 1 contend, however, that the
present Constitution prevents our joining in a treaty creating
a world or regional government. Such a government obviously
would have to be empowered to regulate a host of matters
essentially domestic in character. Secretary of State Dulles
contends, however, that the word "treaty" as used in the
Constitution does not mean an international agreement "to
circumvent the constitutional procedures established in relation to what are essentially matters of domestic concern." "'
He also ventured the opinion that the treaty-making power
should not be "to effectuate reforms, particularly in relation
to social matters. ..." " Mr. Dulles concluded, however, that
the arousing of public concern "was a correction of the evil,"
making a treaty-control amendment unnecessary. It is the
ancient plea of men in power for a government of men rather
than one of constitutional restraints.
Professor Jessup has taken a much more realistic view of
the treaty-making power. Moreover, he has succeeded far
better than other world government enthusiasts in charting
a path to that goal. He would, of course, employ treaties and
other international agreements in a manner which would be
prevented by S. J. Res. 1. In general, Professor Jessup's plan
is that followed by the American Association for the United
Nations. The United Nations would be transformed gradually into a world government by wider utilization of the
treaty power53 and by a series of flexible Charter interpretations subjecting UN members to "majority rule." "
50

51

See CoRwm, A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE (1951).

Hearings,supra note 10, at 825.
Id. at 824.
53 As pointed out in JEsSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 91 (1948): "It is immaterial to this discussion whether such international legislation takes the form of
52
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Professor Jessup deftly punctures bubble-headed visions
of a constitutional convention representing the peoples of the
world. He makes the incontestable point that "a world constitution.., can be achieved only through the action of governments and their representatives." " What could possibly
be more oppressive than life under a world constitution and
world legislation enacted by non-elected representatives of
the people? The One World Government of Professor Jessup
is to he-highly un-democratic, regimented by an international
police force equipped with atomic bombs," and perhaps consoled by the thought that civil war inside the global prison
would be better than one between sovereign states since the
outcome "would be the strengthening of world government." " Such is the magnitude of the issues at stake in the
nationwide debate on a treaty-control amendment.
Need for CongressionalRegulation of
Executive Agreements
Section 3 of S. J. Res. 1 reads as follows:
Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and
other agreements with any foreign power or international organization. All such agreements shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties by this article.

What is the distinction between treaties and other international agreements? What did the Founding Fathers have
in mind when they used the word "treaty" and took such
pains to see that this vast power was not centered in one
additional treaties entered into by the Members of the United Nations as states, or
whether, as is urged by many advocates of 'world government,' it takes the form
of real legislation enacted by a world parliament composed of representatives not of
states but of peoples."
54 Jessup, Law of InternationalContractualAgreements, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 378,
397 (1947).
55
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man?58 All available evidence as to the tramers' intent shows
that they intended the word "treaty" to encompass all international agreements known to them as treaties and all agreements thereafter made possessing comparable characteristics
and importance.59
As late as 1939, Assistant Secretary of State Francis B.
Sayre said:"0
International agreements involving political issues or
changes of national policy and those involving international
arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form
of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies
and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or
less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements.

In the past ten years the effort to use treaties and executive
agreements interchangeably has been intensified. Dr. Wallace
McClure, one-time chief of the Treaty Division, Department
of State, wrote in 1941: 1
The President, acting with Congress, where simple majorities
prevail, can, in the matter of international acts, legally accomplish under the Constitution anything that can be legally
accomplished by the treaty-making power as specifically defined in the Constitution....
The result is that for controversial international acts the
Senate method may well be quietly abandoned, and the instruments handled as executive agreements. But for large numbers
of purely routine acts, about which no public opinion exists and
no question as to their acceptability arises, the present (treaty)
method is desirable as saving the time of the House of Representatives.
58 As Hamilton explained in THE FEDERAUST, No. 75 at 487 (Mod. Library ed.
1937): "This history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of
human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of
the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be
a President of the United States."
59 Fraser, Treaties and Executive Agreements, SEN. Doc. No. 244, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1944).
60 Sayre, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act, 39 CoL. L. Rv.
751, 755 (1939).
61
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Senators know only too well that the McClure theory received at least partial acceptance in the Department. Many
international agreements have been made by the President
alone or approved by the Congress which were many times
more important than treaties submitted to the Senate during
the same period. Before reviewing the present administration's opposition to congressional regulation of executive and
other agreements, it should be clearly understood that neither
President Eisenhower nor Secretary of State Dulles subscribes to the McDougal-Lans-McClure theory that treaties
and executive agreements are wholly interchangeable.
Speaking in opposion to congressional regulation of executive agreements, Secretary Dulles said:6 2 "Ithas long been
recognized that there is an undefined, and probably undefinable, borderline between Executive agreements which may
be made by the President alone and those that require validation by the Senate as treaties, or the Congress as laws." Mr.
Dulles conceded that this "undefined" border line had caused
controversy between the executive and legislative branches
of government. He did not explain his reason for believing
that the President was better able than the Congress to
respect the "undefinable border line."
The State Department's opposition to the executive agreements section of S. J. Res. 1 is based on a number of misconceptions. First, it was argued that S. J. Res. 1 as introduced
would prevent the President from making any agreement for
which Congress had not given prior authorization." Although
rather farfetched, this objection has been overcome in the
revised text recommended by the Senate Judiciary Cornmittee.
A second misconception is Mr. Dulles' belief that the danger attached to agreements not ratified by either House of
Congress "cannot be great" because such agreements "cannot
62
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constitutionally become law of the land." " The Secretary of
State apparently overlooks the decision in United States v.
Pink65 holding that the unratified Roosevelt-Litvinov Assignment superseded the law of the State of New York. The
Supreme Court said: 66 "A treaty is a 'law of the land' under
the supremacy clause ... of the Constitution. Such interna-

tional compacts and agreements as the Litvinov Assignment
have a similar dignity."
A third misconception is that Congress cannot be trusted
to legislate wisely with respect to the making of international
agreements other than treaties.67 The fact is that Congress in
recent years has authorized in advance or subsequently approved approximately 85 per cent of all major executive
agreements.68
Basically, the administration's objection to congressional
regulation of executive agreements as a matter of right stems
from an unsound view of the constitutional separation-ofpowers doctrine. For example, Mr. Dulles asserted that the
President had "exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the current conduct of foreign affairs." " A memorandum prepared
by the Legal Adviser of the State Department reveals this
basis for that conclusion:70
Perhaps the unique feature of out Constitution is the provision for the separation of powers between the legislative,
executive, and judicial, each supreme in its field, the whole
constituting a system of checks and balances. The proposer
amendment would destroy this separation insofar as it relates
to the President's constitutional authority in the realm of
foreign affairs.

Almost all students of government know that executive,
legislative, and judicial powers are not contained in hermet64

Id. at 828.
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Id. at 230.
67 Hearings,supra note 10, at 867.
68 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. J.
Res. 130, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 82 (1952).
69 Hearings,supra note 10, at 827.
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ically sealed compartments. Each branch, though primarily
responsible in its own field, participates to a considerable
degree in the work of the other two branches. The President,
for example, is a partner in the legislative process and a very
significant factor in the judicial process. The Constitutional
system of checks and balances was designed to ensure cooperation between three branches of federal government. It
was not intended to inspire competition for power among three
branches of government, each exercising a supreme and exclusive authority in its own field. This cooperative concept
of governmental separation of powers is particularly important in foreign relations. All Americans recognize today that
foreign policy decisions represent life-and-death issues. They
insist that the determination of foreign policy, insofar as
practicable, be made the responsibility of the President and
all 531 members of Congress.7 1
During the Senate debate, Section 3 was stricken from the
text reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The purpose of the second sentence of Section 3 was retained, however, by including the words "other international agreement"
in preceding sections.
The provision confirming Congress' power to regulate the
making of executive agreements was eliminated in the belief
that this controversial feature was merely declaratory of
Congress' existing power under the "necessary and proper"
clause of the Constitution. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is considering several resolutions calling for some
measure of Congressional control over international agreements other than treaties.72
71 Many lawyers and members of Congress believe that section 3 of S. J. Res. 1
is merely declaratory of existing law. For example, regulation of executive agreements under the existing power of Congress is provided for in the McCarran Resolution, S. J. Res. 2-, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). See testimony of Alfred J. Schweppe,
Chairman, American Bar Association Committee on Peace and Law Through United
Nations, Hearings,supra note 10, at 1243-54.
72 E.g., S. J. Res. 2 introduced on January 7, 1953, by Senator McCarran for
himself and Senator Bricker, 99 CONG. REc. 156 (1953).
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Prior to the vote on final passage of S. J. Res. 1, the Senate
adopted the substitute text of Senator George reading as
follows:
Section 1. A provision of a treaty or other international agreement which conflicts with this Constitution
shall not be of any force or effect.
Section 2. An international agreement other than a
treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only by an Act of the Congress.
Section 3. On the question of advising and consenting to the ratification of a treaty the vote shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons
voting for and against shall be entered on the Journal of
the Senate.
The George substitute failed by one vote to receive the
necessary two-thirds." As of the time this article is written,
the Senate's adverse vote is subject to reconsideration on the
motion filed by Senator Lennon.74
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